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Artificial Intelligence and the Risk of an Inverted Analogy

La inteligencia artificial y el riesgo de una analogía invertida

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to present the general elements that allow us to discuss the reality of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and its place in the world as a technological object. The intention is to suggest the need to revert the Intelligence Analogy that is primarily human and artificial just in a derivate form. To do so, first, a conceptual itinerary will be made showing some of the most important elements that philosophy has shown about human intelligence. In that way, it is possible to contrast the metaphor of AI. Thus, to distinguish the sense in which the words "intelligence" and "artificial" are used in reference to machines. In raising these aspects, we will address the distinction between mechanical and technological objects with the intention of showing some of the specificities of AI. Finally, the question is if, in the face of all these distinctions generated by the analysis of the reality of "artificial intelligence" as a novelty that has greater autonomy from the human, but uses all its mathematical ingenuity and communicative skills, it is necessary to propose more appropriate terms and categories to avoid the inversion of the Anthropological Analogy and to give precise contours to the marketing of these technologies.

Keywords

Intelligence, Artificial Intelligence, Technology, Human Being, Ethics, Responsibility.

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Resumen

Este trabajo tiene como objetivo plantear los elementos generales que permitan discutir la realidad de la inteligencia artificial (IA) y su lugar en el mundo como objeto tecnológico. Con esto se pretende plantear la necesidad de revertir la analogía de la inteligencia que en primer lugar es humana y solo de forma derivada artificial. Para ello, inicialmente, se hará un recorrido conceptual de algunos de los elementos más importantes que la filosofía ha dado a conocer sobre la inteligencia humana. De esta forma, es posible hacer un contraste con la metáfora de la IA. Es decir, distinguir el sentido con que se usan las palabras "inteligencia" y "artificial" en referencia a las máquinas. Al plantear estos aspectos abordaremos la distinción entre los objetos mecánicos y tecnológicos con la intención de mostrar algunas de las especificidades de la IA. Con esto en mente, se aborda una última cuestión en torno a si, frente a todas estas distinciones que genera el análisis de la realidad de la "inteligencia artificial" como una novedad que tiene mayor autonomía frente a lo humano, pero que usa todo su ingenio matemático y sus habilidades comunicativas, es necesario proponer términos y categorías más apropiadas para evitar la inversión de la analogía antropológica y dar contornos precisos al *marketing* de estas tecnologías.

Palabras clave

Inteligencia, inteligencia artificial, tecnología, ser humano, ética, responsabilidad.

That is the wonderful thing about human beings: we never get discouraged or upset enough to give up trying to do it all over again, because we know that it is important and worthwhile.
Ray Bradbury, Fahrenheit 451

Introduction

The risk posed by new technologies today is probably not that some literary or cinematic fictions will come true, in which human life is endangered by the exponential growth of artificial intelligence (AI), leading it to spiral out of control and turn against mankind. Although the autonomy of machines is currently shrouded in mystery, it is certain that we should not expect them to go out of control and do things that are beyond their architecture[1]. According to various philosophers and sociologists from a wide range of traditions, the real catastrophe that AI could cause is that, as an aid to certain human activities —which have often been rightly or wrongly claimed to be uniquely human—it could mortally damage them and, with them, essential areas of life such as memory, learning, critical thinking, art, the exercise of freedom, and the importance of face-to-face relationships (Barrios *et al.*, 2020).

This is nothing new. As French philosopher Éric Sadin (2017, p. 34) says, it is a process of digitization of human existence. Today, areas such as play, knowledge, profession, social relationships of love and friendship, sexuality, economics, politics, in other words, human life in general, are

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becoming "virtualized" and, in this way, are being transformed as are "the traditional ways of being and relating to the world" (Gonzálvez-Pérez & Cortijo-Ruiz, 2023, p. 44). Specifically, this is happening through specialized algorithms that present users with what they "want" and, in theory, respond to their preferences. However, *customization* in these circumstances seems more synonymous with "commodification" than with respect for the person. It is a process by which human beings become trapped in electronic devices and in the trends, influences, stories, narratives, and empirical certainties that algorithms offer them and that, paradoxically, undermine their most noble faculties. Therefore, it is not entirely unreasonable to say that the thinking subject of Modernity is being replaced by an *algorithmic subject (*Sadin, 2017, p. 60). This is not happening because human beings are ultimately thinking or mathematical beings (Quiceno & Morales, 2024), but because algorithms are becoming a source of certainty and a way of life (Sadin, 2020, p. 58).

The appropriateness of the emergence of this algorithmic subject is what needs to be reviewed when considering any strategy for regulating these technologies (Karasinski & Birolo, 2022). This is the only way to avoid surrendering to the impressive performance of AI and to remember both human responsibility and the philosophical reflection behind it. It must also be recognized that philosophy, in a certain sense, is at a disadvantage in the face of rapid technological advances and can only evaluate them with greater perspective in *hindsight.* In this sense, on the one hand, human responsibility is the *fulcrum* of the entire discussion; without this fundamental awareness, it is normal for this process of digitization to be a form of consensual self-destruction. On the other hand, given that technology normally runs far ahead of philosophy, we must recognize that we now live suffocated by propaganda, imaginings, films, and *marketing,* which seem to "render us incapable of properly assimilating what we are encountering" (Pérez Marcos, 2023, p. 17).

Consequently, by focusing on human responsibility and its relationship with its own work, the aim of this paper is to highlight some of the most important aspects of human intelligence so that we can discuss the reality of "artificial intelligence," its place in the world as a technological object and product, and reverse the meaning with which the terms are used. The latter is what has been called "reversing analogies." This is especially important because these technologies are gaining more and more space in human life and at times it seems to be positioning as the very way in which essential realities are understood and, as a consequence, give rise to other types of reductions that undermine dignity, education, and science.

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To achieve this objective, documentary sources have been reviewed to highlight some of the most important aspects of human intelligence and to propose what we believe are the essential features that define the phenomenon of AI. The aim is to show the need to discuss, review, and reverse the analogies or metaphors used by technology to describe its activity, which are gradually gaining cultural ground as the very meanings with which we understand things.

The document is therefore structured in three parts. First, a conceptual summary of the essential aspects of human intelligence is provided. Second, a definition of the AI metaphor is provided, seeking to distinguish the meaning with which the words intelligence and artificial are used in reference to humans and machines. In this reflection, it is essential to analyze the characteristics of AI in order to find both its similarities and characteristics, considering that it is a work made in the image of certain cognitive processes of human beings and that it has a *markedly anthropomorphic tendency.* Finally, we seek to answer the question of whether, given all the distinctions that the analysis raises, it is necessary to propose a linguistic apparatus with new, more precise categories that give clear contours to the *marketing* and literary fictions of these new technologies. The idea is to suggest that, given the emergence and importance of these technologies in human life, it is necessary at least to debate the issue.

Intelligence cannot be artificial

It is difficult to be exhaustive in such a short space on a subject as broad as intelligence. This is a subject that could also lead to reflection in different areas of philosophy, experimental science, and even theology. It would also be pretentious to say that all aspects of intelligence can be covered, even the most important ones. The idea is to attempt to outline a conceptual synthesis of what is considered appropriate for a non-reductionist reflection on the subject, which, of course, does not claim to be exhaustive. We seek to show the magnitude of a reflection that will remain open as long as intelligence itself exists and to contrast what we commonly refer to today as "artificial intelligence," which is, in part, the objective of this work.

We start with two pillars of Western thought: Plato and Aristotle. Plato (1872) left behind for posterity his reflections on the transcendence of ideas, the recognition of the rationality of the world, and the importance of self-knowledge. For his part, Aristotle (1994) has left clues as to what it means to intentionally open intelligence to everything that exists,

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including the divine, with whom, according to him, he seems to be related in this very way.

Plato left behind a legacy of the philosophy of ideas. The Athenian philosopher understood that, in some way, human beings are capable of communicating meaningfully and that this communication involves a common ground that does not depend on the speaker's perspective, but rather on the very consistency of reality (Ricoeur, 2013, pp. 24, 152). In this sense, ideas initially transcend the empirical world (Franck, 2018, p. 104) and suggest the existence of a type of reality that has its own stability, that invites contemplation, that illuminates the reality of experience as a form of concretion and for which the only ones capable are, precisely, intelligent beings (Plato, 1988, p. 342). In this *stabilitas* of theory lies the fact that the ideas of philosophy remain active in human life almost continuously (Gilbert, 2008, p. 64), as if they were a legacy passed down from generation to generation. In modern empirical sciences, this occurs according to the very evolution of what is considered "progress," given that, focused on what is supposed to be progress, they continually change the knowledge and certainties they attain, continually replacing them. Technology in this case is quite paradigmatic.

Secondly, Plato (1872) made humanity aware of the rationality of the world, as he describes in *Timaeus*, "the world has order and structure" (p. 164). However, the Athenian goes a step further when he interprets that the *order* of the world is the result of an intelligence capable of putting everything in its place. In this sense, he argues that human intelligence is capable of grasping this order and recognizing what is intelligent through rationality. Conversely, "rationality is the manifestation of an intelligence capable of establishing it" (Soler and López, 2005, p. 30), a legality that can be described (and which would be the principle of all prescription) through the different modalities of language with which we try to express it. In this case, not only categorical language, but also, for example, mathematical, physical, or biochemical language. Therefore, the principle of all basic and experimental science is to understand that the world has a rationality that can be known and communicated (Soler and López, 2005).

Finally, Plato (2018), as a result of his deep connection with Socrates, left for posterity his reflection on self-knowledge. For human beings, knowledge of the world is, at the same time, knowledge of oneself.

Aristotle (1994, p. 69) takes up this teaching in his own way, but his contribution to the understanding of intelligence is superlative. Firstly, that knowledge is marked by desire, by a kind of insatiable hunger for

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knowledge and a source of infinite novelty that dwells in human nature. But he adds that, in the forms of knowledge, human beings have a particularity, which is that their *nous poietikós* is capable of "making all things" (1978, p. 234). In this way, Aristotle understood that for intelligence to have such power, it had to be capable of abstraction, of bringing the intimacy of beings to itself and knowing them in their deepest radicality. This, as he rightly states, is only possible with an intelligence that is "impassive, non-material, and therefore immortal" (p. 234). Hence his doubts about the human character of intelligence.

However, it was Christian thinkers who took this issue to a deeper level by connecting it with the possibility of human beings knowing themselves (Augustine, 2019), exploring the personal transcendence of that knowledge (Landsberg, 2016, p. 322) and emphasizing the search for truth as a manifestation of that original encounter.

These thinkers[2] recognized that human beings, although insignificant in relation to the infinity of the universe, have within themselves the potential to know it and be aware of it. As Pascal (1986) masterfully describes:

> Man is but a reed, the weakest thing in nature; but he is a thinking reed. The entire universe need not take up arms against him to crush him: a vapor, a drop of water is enough to kill him. But even if the universe crushed him, man would still be nobler than what kills him, since he knows that he dies and knows the superiority that the universe has over him, while the universe knows nothing (pp. 63-64).

Surely, knowing the vast universe does not seem possible in any effective way. But the fact that human beings are open to knowing it intentionally reveals the depth of their inner nature, which is as infinite as the cosmos, even *more expansive* if one considers their task and their awareness of that task. Hence, many of these thinkers came to understand that both knowledge of the world and knowledge of oneself, with their mixed complexity, is an unlimited task that speaks to the very nature of human beings (Descartes, 1991).

These same thinkers took the question of intelligence to a second level of transcendence that Plato could not have fully imagined, i.e., that intelligence is personal (Di Nissa, 2000, p. 119). This means that the nobility of intelligence comes from the very dignity of the person who possesses it (Spaemann, 2010) and that, since it is about someone and not something, knowledge can only be personal and interpersonal and, therefore, lived and acted upon (Stein, 2020, p. 163). This is very important when considering intelligence and is often overlooked. Intelligence is

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not characteristic of separate beings; one cannot be humanly intelligent without a body (Landsberg, 2006, p. 14) and, ontologically, without a person who is aware of what he/she knows (Serretti, 2008, p. 82), of his/her emotions (Rodríguez Valls, 2015), and of the contents of consciousness that *he/she receives from* and *delivers to* those with whom the person integrates the world of life (Ricoeur, 2006, p. 379).

Thus, it could be said that intelligence without people, without ideas, without a body, without relationships, without emotions, and without actions is not true intelligence. Furthermore, only people can discriminate between knowledge. Their self-awareness allows them to differentiate between truth and falsehood, partiality and deliberate error, and ideology and the first principles of reality. As medieval doctors have reflected at length, truth is appropriate to intelligence (Thomas Aquinas, 2007, p. 38), that is why it usually has value in and of itself. It is sought because it perfects human beings and allows them to find meaning in existence. This does not preclude the search for utility, but in a sense, it serves as a guide.

In light of the above, the intelligence we call "artificial" is not intelligence and can perhaps only be seen as a potential complement (Khasawneh *et al*., 2024, p. 309). Intelligence cannot be artificial because it can only be personal. This idea could already be suspected from the argument, and although it is also a fact of experience, it is often questioned in light of the speed and enormous capacity of machines to structure the data available to them. For this reason, it is increasingly difficult to perceive the difference, and it is not even certain that everyone sees it this way.

In fact, the discussion seems to arise from neuroscience—which plays a role here that we cannot[3] develop—through a mechanistic view of human knowledge (McCulloch & Pitts, 1990) and, more precisely, of the human brain, which for many "is what thinks" (Changeux, 2005)[4]. With this anthropological perspective in mind, it is assumed that AI is a vastly improved version of the aforementioned core human capacity (Kurzweil, 2005). Here lies both "the foundation of the connectionist doctrine in information sciences" (Sadin, 2020, pp. 64-65) and the reversal of the anthropological analogy and the potential reduction of human beings and their dignity to objects.

AI thrives on reasoning and probabilistic calculation. This is a very important cognitive activity that links consciousness and the world, but it is limited to the processing of information through mathematical formalization. There is no machine, no person (a reality that cannot be reproduced algorithmically), no self-awareness, no body (even if it has a support),

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no multisensory apprehension, no relationality, no awareness of the other, no deliberation, no planning of courses of action for which to take responsibility, no ends and, therefore, no projection and much less ignorance or errors. AI reproduces a very specific aspect of human intelligence that, to a certain extent, has increased in recent times, giving the automation of probabilistic calculation, a magnitude that it does not actually have.

The question, then, is why current technological devices are called "intelligent." The answer must be found in their very activity. Apparently, because they draw on human ingenuity, they naturally appear *smart* (astute and efficient) for certain types of human tasks. Similarly, because they have a greater degree of autonomy than artistic and mechanical productions, something that is timidly beginning to be called technological as an absolute limit of the technical category. This is because once is "turned on" or "set in motion," it does not need or allow human intervention in its "deliberations." This "autonomy" reaches the point where humans begin to fear being surprised, as there is a *space for response* that closely resembles what they recognize in themselves as the principle of interiority (the famous *black box)* and the unpredictability of their freedom. Analyzing the type of AI may shed more light on the task at hand.

Production: between physical processes and conscious life

Without it being necessary to analyze its origins directly, as Wiener (1988) suggests in the statements that drive the American cybernetic movement, AI is driven by an anthropomorphic tendency. This is understandable, on the one hand, because of the image it has as a reference and, on the other, because of its very aspirations (Blanco & Garrido, 2024, p. 174). In other words, a dynamic is set in motion that aims to make this work become like its producer and even go beyond it.

In this case, in order not to stray from the issue, the distinction proposed by the American philosopher John Searle (1980) may be quite useful. AI can be divided into two modes: strong and weak. The goal of strong AI has been lost, and most philosophers and technicians recognize that what is aspired to is beyond the reach of this type of mechanism. It does not seem possible to reproduce a person and their self-awareness either in a laboratory or in a workshop where all possible computing power and the most quantum nanotechnology are combined (Arana, 2015).

Weak AI, on the other hand, which focuses on enhancing the mathematical, programming, and training aspects of algorithms without

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attempting to replace what is truly human, has been more successful (Sadin, 2017, p. 21). The peace of mind that this may offer some is only apparent. Although we should not expect conscious automated beings to wage war on humanity, we must not lose sight of the fact that their capabilities are extremely powerful and have a direct impact on human life (González Cuenca, 2021, p. 152). As Guardini (1982) argues, in technological matters, the risk is always that "the producer renounces the individual life of the work and becomes accustomed to wanting to produce only what the machine allows" (p. 53). With this, their personal relationship with reality disappears, placing their trust and their life in the hands of their product.

For these reasons, it must be said that when this mechanism is described as artificial, the statement is only partially correct. Specifically, it is interpreted as something that is not alive, is not personal, and is not produced by generation, but rather as the result of the transformative power of human beings in the world. However, in this case, the artificial is a limit that algorithms cross by virtue of their relationship with human intelligence. Thus, there is an aspect of human rationality that cannot be reduced to other useful products (such as a hammer or a pot) or mechanical products (such as the pulley or gear systems found in a factory).

To that extent, it should also be specified that weak AI is a mechanism that represents a sophistication of human action. It brings together all the computing power of mathematics, whose formality involves a degree of abstraction from the experience of the world, the development of programming languages with great capacities to encompass various variables of reality and respond to them in multiple ways, and, of course, the combination with an electromechanical support that allows it to function.

These aspects allow us to see something of the complexity of AI, but at the same time something of its specificity. As Hannah Arendt (2005) comments when analyzing the types of acts, actions, and activities of human beings in the world, in classical antiquity there was hardly any distinction between art and technical production. Both, in fact, were referred to as the fruit of the same type of human labor: *poiēsis*. A shoemaker and a blacksmith were the same as artists in that both were producers of an aspect of reality that was a copy of an original model or a simple cultural or utilitarian aspect that constituted public life (Arendt, 2005, p. 170).

However, taking a great leap forward[5], with what is now called modern philosophy and physics, a gap appears between them. Within human productive works, one thing is the result that emerges from art and another is the result of the manufacture of devices. The latter involves an attempt to give autonomy to the work through mechanical functioning

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or an internal "logic" or "physics" between its constituent parts. "Mechanical" is no longer understood as an extension of human capabilities, but as something that crystallizes through a calculated and efficient process involving human ingenuity. However, the mechanical has a particularity, which is that its latent processes *are patent.* In other words, they can be interrupted by human action and, to a certain extent, redirected not only in their purpose but also intervened in their principle and execution, even though they maintain autonomy from the human body and, only in part, from human intelligence.

To say that mechanical processes are patent implies, to a certain extent, accepting that humans can intervene in their architecture, in their step-by-step programming, and in the purpose of their exercise. In this sense, if these variables function properly, the mechanical process is normally predictable. Thus, the actions of a bottling machine, a sewing machine, a rice cooker, or a car can be known in advance. Machines are predictable because they follow precise laws and instructions that humans put into them and that allow them to see their results without much difficulty, except for errors that are normally mechanical or programming errors.

At this point, it must be said that the technical (which can still be identified *tout court* as the mechanical) achieves a higher degree of this productive aspect in technology, but even more so, it achieves its own specificity through its relationship with human cognitive aspects. This specificity can be described in at least three ways: its *greater degree of autonomy*, its *computational capacity*, and its *human coating*.

AI implies a greater "distance" between the machine and its dependence on human intervention. This is what its greater autonomy refers to and implies a difference from the mechanical. If mechanics already implied "letting things run according to established laws" and a "withdrawal" from the human body, in AI human intervention almost disappears in the process of performing tasks and implies a "withdrawal" from human intelligence. In this case, it is possible to act on the architecture and expect a result on which the mechanism can be evaluated. However, the "parts," "steps," and "sequences" are veiled from the user (Arão, 2024, p. 3). In this sense, a response that seems unexpected is expected, and the machine receives feedback on its performance, which allows it to refine its predictions. Through probabilistic calculation, it can integrate interaction into its response capacity. This has meant that the metaphor of learning has also been extended to refer to the fact that AI adapts to different contexts of interaction and improves the quality of its responses.

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AI, even though it has mechanical elements, performs a series of "internal" processes in which humans can no longer intervene and which make its results seemingly unpredictable (something that goes even beyond the design or architecture of the machines and the probabilistic algorithms that govern them). Its computational power also plays a role here. Humans working in technology have strived to digitize reality, reducing it to storable data.

That is why the second aspect that characterizes AI is its computing power. Data scientists rigorously and efficiently refine their algorithms with the aim of producing high-quality syntheses of this vast amount of digitized information in increasingly shorter times and with greater accuracy in terms of the possibilities available. Thus, if the automatic response of an AI can already cause surprise, the quality of the result can dazzle or cause deep confusion when it addresses truly human questions. These are feelings that many may already have experienced when dealing closely with the possibilities of these systems.

The third specific aspect of this technology lies in the way they use to display their results. AI has been programmed through the mathematization of logic so that it can respond humanly with actions such as language and art (music, painting, literature). Essentially, the complexity of technological processes has been disguised with some essential aspects of humanity. Hence, it appears as "something" with which a back-and-forth exchange can be established, an *input* and *output* of information that closely emulates the human communication process (a fact that would fool Turing and several other unsuspecting individuals). In this way, AI enters human life as something capable of intervening in its own sociocultural narrative and possessing the very reasonableness of the world, insofar as it can be digitized, as an open horizon for its activity.

For some, these distinctions may fall short, but for others, it is the possibility of turning the rationality of the world into a computational rationality. "Everything is data." Thus, it is possible to fly thousands of planes at the same time and reduce accidents, allow patients to successfully treat their ailments, identify people in criminal acts, make *marketing* and trade strategies more efficient, find lost monuments, and convert databases of legal, medical, psychological, or political judgments into "objective" and "structured" opinions via algorithms. The magnitude of these activities makes it not common for this tool to be associated with "the pursuit and attainment of power" (Niño *et al.*, 2024, p. 251).

It seems clear that terms in one sense are beginning to fall short, and therefore some concepts such as intelligence, learning, ethics, artifi-

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cial, synthesis, language, ontology, freedom, etc. are becoming confusing and impoverishing reality. This raises an essential question: given the specificity of this type of technological work, is it necessary to coin new terminology that allows us to distinguish between things so that they are not confused with one another?

A new lexicon for technology

It is relevant to ask whether, in the face of the novelty of AI, it is necessary to propose new categories. Initially, it must be said that the question is important for at least two reasons. Firstly, because this problem has also arisen in relation to environmental awareness and animal welfare: the idea that animals have a specificity in relation to humans and that understanding this can lead to a responsible way of approaching the natural world and establishing certain limits on uncontrolled human action. This issue also has a fundamental anthropological correlate, given that predating the natural world is tantamount to humans preying on themselves. In the case of AI, it would not be a question of creating an ethics of AI, as some transhumanists such as Bostrom (2011) propose, but rather an ethics for AI, as Benanti (2022) suggests. Secondly, this new terminology would make it possible to distinguish between what is properly human and what is technological (Ocampo Ponce, 2024). Sadin (2020) is emphatic in denouncing that technological movements have borrowed an entire philosophical lexicon "from the register of cognitive sciences without any shame or concern for terminological precision" (p. 19). A clear example is the use of words such as "artificial intelligence," "*machine learning,*" "*deep learning,*" and "web ontologies." In these cases, we speak of intelligence, learning, and ontology, and use these terms to refer to mechanisms that do not resemble what they refer to. If there is any similarity in any case, it is philosophically clear that the difference is higher.

Despite this, it should be recognized that, while these distinctions could help defend human dignity and certain abuses of *marketing* by technology companies and political propaganda, they overlook the simple fact that it is human beings who epistemologically order the world and that there is undoubtedly an ontological kinship, both with nature and with the work produced. Thus, the proposal is as simple as it is common sense: to recover the reflection on the human being as *princeps analogatum.* It is a matter of turning our gaze back to the fact that AI is not the evolution of human intelligence, but simply its aspect most closely linked to calculation, parameters, and the workings of reason.

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In this way, two paths are proposed that are quite convenient for human beings and for the philosophy that deals with these issues. One is to continue reflecting on the fundamental aspects of human existence and, especially, on the question of who human beings are. Second, to recognize that when faced with nature and with our own work, it is human beings whom we must study in depth in order to better understand the reality that surrounds us and the responsibility we have for what we do in the world. The logical reason for this exercise in responsibility is that, as far as we know, human beings are the only beings capable of thinking about themselves and the cosmos. If these analogies are found in animals and machines, it is because, in the first case, it is human beings who recognize a relationship of similarity in them and try to name their behavior and, in the second case, because it is human beings who design machines as a way of helping to perfect their actions and activities in the world. When the analogy is reversed, this is exactly what is meant.

It seems increasingly clear that the question of human responsibility poses an enormous challenge. One can think of the difficulty of arbitrating the question of who should be responsible for the results delivered by AI. This is because the relationship with AI is not experienced as a continuous event arising from the exercise of freedom. In reality, the engineer and the direct and indirect users, as well as the algorithm itself, are only partially "accountable" (again extending the language in the latter case). Responsibility, which is a personal prerogative, appears fragmented in the face of AI. On the one hand, because the user has no way of intervening in the biases of an AI and because the algorithm synthesizes information that has a diversity of authors—hence the credit for the work cannot be attributed solely to the person who writes a *prompt*. On the other hand, because the absence of apparent consequences in reality, beyond the virtual realm, erodes the moderating influence of ethics on users. Robbing a bank with a couple of commands, for example, may seem like a game, and the consequences for the people and institutions affected are barely visible.

For this reason, it is important to consider how to think about shared responsibility without diluting personal responsibility. Surely, as some have reflected, this should promote the increasingly necessary fact that institutions must have human faces and decisions must be traceable within them and in their algorithms. But this is a matter that needs to be discussed much more publicly.

Thus, returning to the ontological and linguistic question, it seems that today it is essential to turn our gaze back to anthropology and try to ensure that in the various spheres in which human beings carry out

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their actions (such as interpersonal, educational, work, economic, or political), their dignity and the task of responsibility that their intelligence implies can always be recognized. It does not seem a good option for human beings to dissolve into their work because of insecurity about their own vulnerabilities or because of a desire for extremely deceptive power. This does not exclude the possibility that, in some sectors of reality, it may be advisable to coin certain terms that can be accepted by the scientific and academic community so that we can speak more accurately about this phenomenon, whose possibilities and risks still need to be better understood. Some concepts can be proposed, such as "computer producers," "data compilation," or "web positioning," which are closer to cyber reality and detract less from notions such as "intelligence," "learning," or "ontology," respectively. It must be emphasized that this is an issue that should be discussed publicly and openly in various forums with the aim of making the population aware of the differences and genuine similarities. A clear example is what has happened in the European Commission, where an attempt has been made to propose a human-centered perspective to address the problem of trustworthy AI (Terrones Rodríguez & Rocha Berardi; Roche Berardi, 2024, p. 222). However, in the case of this paper, we only seek to point out a few examples to illustrate the issue and, insofar as it may be helpful, to dispel some of the fear that ignorance about them may cause.

As Romano Guardini (1982, p. 121) argued, we must not capitulate in the face of technology. On the contrary, as it is a work that arises from the consortium of the noblest human powers, it requires greater effort and discipline for human beings to grow through it rather than become diluted. The exercise of responsibility by the most educated members of society is essential, as it is an attack on human dignity for human intelligence to be the raw material of artificial intelligence, just as iron and wood were the raw materials of large factories. For this reason, it may be healthy to limit the exercise of something for which we are not yet mature, and which seems to require mature consciences (Perezchica *et al.*, 2024).

This is the way to reverse the analogy, i.e., starting from a right consciousness of oneself that is not afraid of one's own vulnerabilities and responsibly recognizes one's own capacities. Anchoring reflection in a healthy anthropology prevents human beings from conforming or mistakenly identifying with their work and seeing in it the real reflection of a perfection that makes them feel simultaneously vulnerable and more capable. This middle or virtuous position is difficult to achieve; most of the time it is even unpopular and, in its distortion, as described by philo-

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sopher and psychiatrist Thomas Fuchs (2023, p. 543), it is reminiscent in every way of the tragedy of Narcissus. The story of a man in love with his own image who gradually loses himself and, blinded by his desires, dies in the arms of his spectral figure: AI.

Conclusions

We have attempted to show the complexity of reality and the reflection of human intelligence, a subject that remains open and does not seem to be reducible to algorithmic calculation or stored data, as is intended through AI. As mentioned above, human intelligence is enormously complex and cannot be reproduced or emulated simply through probabilistic calculation. Furthermore, new computational technologies are realities that combine certain cognitive aspects with other material aspects that have their own specificity as human creations. In this sense, they are not mere extensions that perform tasks or generate pleasure, but rather occupy a space between the human and the mechanical.

In this case, it is precisely the human aspect of AI that needs to be continuously evaluated. Certain technological dystopias are not expected to come to pass, such as the one that posits that the combination of robotics and computational rationality could generate humanoids that get out of control and attempt to end or diminish human life (unless we program them to do so). It is true that, since its inception, AI has been driven by the desire to reproduce human consciousness through the power of technology. This desire, as several contemporary thinkers recognize, seems increasingly unrealizable, although it is not certain that new technologies will not awaken this ancient creative impulse in the future. Therefore, what is at stake is rather to assess the markedly anthropomorphic orientation of these technologies and the enormous impact they are beginning to have on different areas of human life. As Sadin (2020) said, a change of era is emerging through the digitization of life. Human beings are beginning to seek truth, friendship, fun, love, and certainty through algorithms. Therefore, the new spectral reality of technology may jeopardize essential human aspects linked to interpersonal relationships, authentic learning, the configuration of science, and, in general, the different strata of society that take part in this matter (states, institutions, universities, economic entities, and users in general).

This responsibility lies, first and foremost, in restoring awareness to human beings that AI is a creation that has come out of their hands

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and is nourished by their ingenuity and capacity. Human beings must take charge of it with mature awareness. They must not believe that they are playing God, nor that what they have produced is a humiliation for their lives. That is why it is not trivial to look back at language as a way of addressing this issue in its common configuration and to recognize that it is necessary to speak clearly in order to avoid confusion and reductions that ultimately undermine human dignity. Consequently, reversing the analogy is a way of returning our gaze to anthropology, with the intention of avoiding some of the totalitarian errors of the past, which are, of course, *the chronicle of a death foretold.*

Notes

1 We have found a good summary of this discussion in Volpato Dutra and De Góes (2024, pp. 2-5).
2 Some examples include St. Gregory of Nicaea, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Pascal, Descartes, and some contemporaries such as Romano Guardini, Paul Landsberg, Edith Stein, and Karol Wojtyla.
3 We recommend the excellent summary presented in the work of Murillo (2024).
4 Although neuroscience is initially recognized as experimental, neuroscientists often structure their findings in a philosophical way. In this sense, theoretical aspects are repeated by some of the leading authors in this experimental discipline. We propose the paradigmatic examples of Kandel (2019), Gazzaniga (2019), Aguado (2019), and Damasio (2022).
5 Without attempting to reduce the issue to a few philosophical notes, I find myself in line with Guardini (1982) on this matter, when he says that in the Christian world "the rational, instinctive, and contemplative-creative elements are approximately in balance in the way man understands nature, behaves towards it, uses it, and shapes it. Man takes possession of what is given, intensifies its forms, increases its effects, but essentially and as a whole, does not break its structure" (p. 50).
6 Some stronger mechanists, following Descartes, think that animals are included in this view, and other contemporary materialists, through behaviorism, also include human beings.
7 The artistic case has been much discussed recently in relation to AI, with some considering its activity to be fundamentally plagiarism (Marburger, 2024, p. 5).

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