Didactical projections of the argumentative theory of reasoning
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Abstract
The goal of the article aims at establishing a dialogue between three lines of inquiry within contemporary epistemology: Virtue Epistemology, Bounded Rationality and Argumentative Theory of Reasoning. Faced with the problem that we are interested in dealing with here, i.e., the search for a theoretical framework that might allow us to design pedagogic strategies (both within the framework of the didactic of philosophy and outside of it) based on realistic premises, Virtue Epistemology will be presented here as a strongly optimistic current from an epistemic viewpoint. The paradigm of Bounded Rationality will represent the exact counterpart, insofar as it seems to lead to a pronounced pessimism concerning the possibility of designing strategies that may allow us to improve the agent’s epistemic practices. In the middle of these two extremes, the Argumentative Theory of Reasoning (developed in the last decade by Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber) represents a promising alternative for two reasons: in the first place, because it offers an answer to the problem (faced by the paradigm of Bounded Rationality) of the adaptive character of human reason from an evolutionary viewpoint; secondly, because it allows us to overcome the epistemic pessimism that is essential to the paradigm of Bounded Rationality when planning pedagogical strategies that are not only realistic but also effective.
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