Teoría de juegos conductual y psicológica: una revisión sistemática

Barra lateral del artículo

PDF HTML EPUB PDF (Inglés)
Publicado: Oct 13, 2022
Actualizado: 2022-10-13
Versiones:
2022-10-13 (6)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17163/ret.n24.2022.07
Palabras clave:
teoría de juegos conductual, teoría de juegos psicológica, economía conductual, teoría de juegos, toma de decisiones, teoría de la decisión, comportamiento social, jerarquía cognitiva

Contenido principal del artículo

Rafael López
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2807-7419
José Luis Calvo
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1666-1551
Ignacio de la Torre
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9933-4518

Resumen

gracias a la teoría de los juegos tenemos una mejor comprensión del comportamiento humano en la economía. Sin embargo, comoesta teoría excluye el aspecto psicológico de la conducta, una revisión del supuesto de racionalidad completa la información perdida en algunos juegos. Como consecuencia, han surgido algunos enfoques que incluyen aspectos conductuales y psicológicos en los juegos. Esto ha generado una gran cantidad de literatura distribuida en líneas de investigación aparentemente independientes, hecho que puede generar confusión. Paraaclarar si la teoría de juegos conductual y psicológica son enfoques independientes, se realizó una revisión sistemática utilizando las directricesPRISMA para identificar todos los estudios empíricos publicados bajo ambas denominaciones. Se recogieron trabajos que (1) tuvieran variablespsicológicas, (2) estuvieran revisados por pares y (3) tuvieran algún diseño experimental. De los 492 trabajos buscados, 67 se incluyeron enesta revisión sistemática. Se organizarwon y estudiaron para determinar qué tipo de variables psicológicas incluían y si realmente existen dos enfoques diferentes o no. El término más utilizado es la teoría del juego conductual, en la que se utilizan ampliamente variables como la culpa,la confianza, la motivación y la reciprocidad. La principal conclusión es que los dos enfoques son realmente el mismo y son los seguidores delos principales autores de cada corriente los que publican bajo uno u otro nombre.

Detalles del artículo

Número
Vol. 12 Núm. 24 (2022): (octubre-marzo)
Sección
Artículos destinados a la sección miscelánea
Creative Commons License

Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.

Autoría: La lista de autores firmantes debe incluir únicamente a aquellas personas que hayan contribuido intelectualmente al desarrollo del trabajo. La colaboración en la recogida de datos no es, por sí misma, criterio suficiente de autoría. "Retos" declina toda responsabilidad por posibles conflictos derivados de la autoría de los trabajos que se publiquen.

Derechos de autor: La Universidad Politécnica Salesiana preserva los derechos de autor de los artículos publicados, y favorece y permite su reutilización bajo la licencia Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Ecuador. Pueden ser copiados, utilizados, difundidos, transmitidos y expuestos públicamente, siempre y cuando: i) se cite la autoría y la fuente original de su publicación (revista, editorial y URL del trabajo); (Ii) no se utilicen con fines comerciales; Iii) se mencione la existencia y especificaciones de esta licencia.

Biografía del autor/a

Rafael López

Es Economista y Grado en Psicología. Estudió un Máster de investigación en emoción, cognición y salud y un posterior Doctorado en Psicología. Desde ese momento comenzó a trabajar en el estudio de variables psicológicas que afectan a la toma de decisiones. Ello le llevó a fundar el Observatorio de Economía de la Conducta en el Colegio de Economistas de Madrid y la Sociedad Científica de Economía de la Conducta. En la actualidad es Rector de Evidentia University of Behavioral & Forensic Sciences y Presidente de la Fundación Universitaria Behavior & Law.

José Luis Calvo

Profesor titular de Teoría Económica y Economía Matemática de la UNED, actualmente especializado en Microeconomía y Economía de la Conducta, ha publicado trabajos de investigación en estas dos áreas además de en Economía de la Educación, Innovación, las PYMES, la Pobreza, la Economía Financiera y el Marketing Experiencial y las Marcas, especialmente de moda. Ha colaborado con instituciones tanto públicas como privadas, habiendo sido asesor de la Presidencia del Gobierno y del Ministerio de Industria en diferentes etapas. En la actualidad dirige la Cátedra de Territorios Sostenibles y Desarrollo Local de la UNED con sede en Ponferrada.

Ignacio de la Torre

Es graduado en Economía por la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid y trabajaactualmente en la empresa Neovantas consulting, consultora dedicada al análisis del comportamiento humano que influye a la realidad detrás de la información desestructurada. Esasistente de investigación en la Fundación Universitaria Behavior and Law en el ámbito de economía de la conducta donde ha sido parte en investigaciones relacionadas con la teoría de juegos conductuales. Su interés de investigación no sólo pasa por la aplicación de teoría de juegos en el ámbito experimental sino también por la aplicación de la teoría de redes sociales en el mismo ámbito.

Referencias

Ackermann, K. A., Fleiss, J. y Murphy, R. O. 2016. Reciprocity as an Individual Difference. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 60(2), 340-367. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002714541854

Adriaanse, C. 2011. The importance of norms: Behavioural game theory as a tool to understand neighbourhood events. Housing, Theory and Society, 28(1), 39-60. https://doi.org/10.1080/14036091003691019

Alvite, M. L. y Rodríguez, B. 2004. Análisis de la distribución de contenidos electrónicos de ScienceDirect. El Profesional de la Información, 13(5), 353-360.

Attanasi, G., Rimbaud, C. y Villeval, M. C. 2019. Embezzlement and guilt aversion. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 167, 409-429. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.02.002

Balafoutas, L. 2011. Public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 78(1-2), 51-59. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2010.12.007

Battigalli, P. y Dufwenberg, M. 2009. Dynamic psychological games. Journal of Economic Theory, 144(1), 1-35. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.01.004

Battigalli, P. y Dufwenberg, M. 2020. Belief-Dependent Motivations and Psychological Game Theory. CESifo Working Paper No. 8285. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3598771

Bellemare, C., Sebald, A. y Suetens, S. 2018. Heterogeneous guilt sensitivities and incentive effects. Experimental Economics, 21(2), 316-336. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-017-9543-2

Benndorf, V., Kubler, D. y Normann, H. T. 2017. Depth of reasoning and information revelation: An experiment on the distribution of k-levels. International Game Theory Review, 19(4). https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198917500219

Berger, U., de Silva, H. y Fellner-Röhling, G. 2016. Cognitive hierarchies in the minimizer game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 130, 337-348. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.08.004

Bernasconi, M. y Galizzi, M. 2010. Network formation in repeated interactions: Experimental evidence on dynamic behaviour. Mind and Society, 9(2), 193-228. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-010-0078-x

Bracht, J. y Regner, T. 2013. Moral emotions and partnership. Journal of Economic Psychology, 39, 313-326. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2013.09.007

Bravo, M. y Mertikopoulos, P. 2017. On the robustness of learning in games with stochastically perturbed payoff observations. Games and Economic Behavior, 103, 41–66. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.004

Brocas, I., Carrillo, J. D., Wang, S. W. y Camerer, C. F. 2014. Imperfect choice or imperfect attention? Understanding strategic thinking in private information games. The Review of Economic Studies, 81(3), 944–970. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdu001

Camerer, C. 2010. behavioural game theory. In Behavioural and Experimental Economics (pp. 42-50). Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280786_6

Camerer, C. y Ho, T. 1999. Experience-weighted attraction learning in normal form games. Econometrica, 67(4), 827-874. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00054

Camerer, C. y Ho, T. 2015. Behavioral game theory experiments and modeling. In Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications (Vol. 4, pp. 517-573). Elsevier B.V. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-53766-9.00010-0

Camerer, C., Ho, T. y Chong, J. K. 2002. Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games. Journal of Economic Theory, 104(1), 137-188. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2002.2927

Camerer, C., Ho, T., y Chong, J. K. 2004. A cognitive hierarchy model of games. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(3), 861-898. https://doi.org/10.1162/0033553041502225

Cardella, E. 2016. Exploiting the guilt aversion of others: do agents do it and is it effective? Theory and Decision, 80(4), 523-560. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-015-9513-0

Charness, G. y Dufwenberg, M. 2006. Promises and partnership. Econometrica, 74(6), 1579-1601. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00719.x

Chen, J. y Houser, D. 2019. Broken promises and hidden partnerships: An experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 157, 754-774. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.007

Collard, L. y Oboeuf, A. 2013. Do dangerous sports specialists play more dangerously? An experimental study on sample selection. Journal of Risk Research, 16(1), 39-50. https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2012.725671

Cueva, C., Iturbe-Ormaetxe, I., Mata-Pérez, E., Ponti, G., Sartarelli, M., Yu, H. y Zhukova, V. 2016. Cognitive (ir)reflection: New experimental evidence. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 64, 81-93. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2015.09.002

Cunha, F., Heckman, J. J. y Schennach, S. M. 2010. Estimating the technology of cognitive and noncognitive skill formation. Econometrica, 78(3), 883-931. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta6551

DeAngelo, G. y McCannon, B. C. 2020. Psychological game theory in public choice. Public Choice, 182(1-2), 159-180. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00676-6

Devetag, G. y Warglien, M. 2003. Games and phone numbers: Do short-term memory bounds affect strategic behavior? Journal of Economic Psychology, 24(2), 189-202. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-4870(02)00202-7

Diekmann, A. 2004. The power of reciprocity. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(4), 487-505. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002704265948

Dufwenberg, M., Gachter, S. y Hennig-Schmidt, H. 2011. The framing of games and the psychology of play. Games and Economic Behavior, 73(2), 459-478. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.003

Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., Haruvy, E. y Katok, E. 2007. A comparison of buyer-determined and price-based multiattribute mechanisms. Marketing Science, 26(5), 629-641. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.1070.0281

Eyster, E. (2019). Errors in strategic reasoning. North-Holland. https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hesbe.2018.11.003

Fehr, D. y Huck, S. 2016. Who knows it is a game? On strategic awareness and cognitive ability. Experimental Economics, 19(4), 713-726. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-015-9461-0

Franzen, A. y Pointner, S. 2013. The external validity of giving in the dictator game: A field experiment using the misdirected letter technique. Experimental Economics, 16(2), 155-169. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-012-9337-5

Fugger, N., Katok, E. y Wambach, A. 2016. Collusion in dynamic buyer-determined reverse auctions. Management Science, 62(2), 518-533. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2142

Geanakoplos, J., Pearce, D. y Stacchetti, E. 1989. Psychological games and sequential rationality. Games and Economic Behavior, 1(1), 60-79. https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90005-5

Geizzelez-Luzardo, M. y Soto-Gómez, G. 2021. Creatividad, colaboración y confianza: aptitud para la cultura innovativa en las redes de investigación estudiantil. IPSA Scientia, Revista Científica Multidisciplinaria, 6(3), 33-43. https://doi.org/10.25214/27114406.1182

Georganas, S., Healy, P. J. y Weber, R. A. 2015. On the persistence of strategic sophistication. Journal of Economic Theory, 159, 369-400. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.012

Giaccherini, M. y Ponti, G. 2018. Preference based subjective beliefs. Games, 9(3), 50. https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030050

Gibbons, R. y Boven, L. van. 2001. Contingent social utility in the prisoners’ dilemma. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 45(1), 1-17. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00170-0

Gill, D. y Prowse, V. 2016. Cognitive ability, character skills, and learning to play equilibrium: A level-k analysis. Journal of Political Economy, 124(6), 1619-1676. https://doi.org/10.1086/688849

Gneezy, U., Rustichini, A. y Vostroknutov, A. 2010. Experience and insight in the race game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 75(2), 144-155. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2010.04.005

Goeree, J. K. y Holt, C. A. 2004. A model of noisy introspection. Games and Economic Behavior, 46(2), 365-382. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00145-3

Goeree, J. K. y Louis, P. 2021. M Equilibrium: a theory of beliefs and choices in games. American Economic Review, 111(12). https://doi.org/10.9767/BCREC.17.1.12366.32-45

Guth, W., Schmittberger, R. y Schwarze, B. 1982. An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 3(4), 367-388. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(82)90011-7

Halevy, N. y Phillips, L. T. 2015. Conflict templates in negotiations, disputes, joint decisions, and tournaments. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 6(1), 13-22. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550614542347

Harsanyi, J. C. 1967. Games with incomplete information played by “Bayesian” players, I–III Part I. The basic model. Management Science, 14(3), 159-182. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159

Haruvy, E. y Katok, E. 2013. Increasing revenue by decreasing information in procurement auctions. Production and Operations Management, 22(1), 19-35. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1937-5956.2012.01356.x

He, S. y Wu, J. 2020. Compromise and coordination: An experimental study. Games and Economic Behavior, 119, 216-233. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.003

Heckman, J. J. y Kautz, T. 2012. Hard evidence on soft skills. Labour Economics, 19(4), 451-464. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2012.05.014

Hillebrandt, H., Sebastian, C. y Blakemore, S. J. 2011. Experimentally induced social inclusion influences behavior on trust games. Cognitive Neuroscience, 2(1), 27-33. https://doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2010.515020

Ho, T., Camerer, C. y Chong, J. K. 2007. Self-tuning experience weighted attraction learning in games. Journal of Economic Theory, 133(1), 177-198. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.12.008

Ho, T. y Weigelt, K. 2005. Trust building among strangers. Management Science, 51(4), 519-530. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0350

Huoviala, P. y Rantala, M. J. 2013. A Putative Human Pheromone, Androstadienone, Increases Cooperation between Men. PLoS ONE, 8(5), e62499. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0062499

Jin, Y. (2020). Does level-k behavior imply level-k thinking? Experimental Economics, 1-24. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-020-09656-w

Johnson, E. J., Camerer, C., Sen, S. y Rymon, T. 2002. Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining. Journal of Economic Theory, 104(1), 16-47. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2850

Johnson, S. G. B. y Rips, L. J. 2015. Do the right thing: The assumption of optimality in lay decision theory and causal judgment. Cognitive Psychology, 77, 42-76. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2015.01.003

Kang, M. J. y Camerer, C. 2018. Measured anxiety affects choices in experimental “clock” games. Research in Economics, 72(1), 49-64. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2017.02.002

Kausel, E. 2017. Assessing others’ risk-taking behavior from their affective states: experimental evidence using a stag hunt game. Games, 8(1), 9. https://doi.org/10.3390/g8010009

Kearns, M., Judd, S., Tan, J. y Wortman, J. 2009. Behavioral experiments on biased voting in networks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 106(5), 1347-1352. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0808147106

Kostelic, K. 2020. Guessing the game: an individual’s awareness and assessment of a game’s existence. Games, 11(2), 17. https://doi.org/10.3390/g11020017

Kreps, D. M. y Wilson, R. 1982. Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2), 253-279. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8

Laing, J. D. y Morrison, R. J. 1974. Sequential games of status. Behavioral Science, 19(3), 177-196. https://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830190304

Leland, J. y Schneider, M. 2015. Salience and strategy choice in 2 × 2 games. Games, 6(4), 521-559. https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040521

Levine, S. S., Bernard, M. y Nagel, R. 2017. Strategic intelligence: the cognitive capability to anticipate competitor behavior. Strategic Management Journal, 38(12), 2390-2423. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2660

Liberati, A., Altman, D. G., Tetzlaff, J., Mulrow, C., Gøtzsche, P. C., Ioannidis, J. P. A., Clarke, M., Devereaux, P. J., Kleijnen, J. y Moher, D. 2009. The PRISMA statement for reporting systematic reviews and meta-analyses of studies that evaluate health care interventions: explanation and elaboration. PLoS Medicine, 6(7), e1000100. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1000100

Lindqvist, E. y Vestman, R. 2011. The labor market returns to cognitive and noncognitive ability: Evidence from the swedish enlistment. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3(1), 101-128. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.3.1.101

Lindsay, L. 2019. Adaptive loss aversion and market experience. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 168, 43-61. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.09.023

Macro, D. y Weesie, J. 2016. Inequalities between others do matter: evidence from multiplayer dictator games. Games, 7(2), 11. https://doi.org/10.3390/g7020011

Maqbool, Z., Makhijani, N., Pammi, V. S. C. y Dutt, V. 2017. Effects of motivation: rewarding hackers for undetected attacks cause analysts to perform poorly. Human Factors, 59(3), 420-431. https://doi.org/10.1177/0018720816681888

Martin, C. F., Biro, D. y Matsuzawa, T. 2014. The Arena System: A novel shared touch-panel apparatus for the study of chimpanzee social interaction and cognition. Behavior Research Methods, 46(3), 611-618. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-013-0418-y

Martin, D. 2017. Strategic pricing with rational inattention to quality. Games and Economic Behavior, 104, 131-145. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.007

Mas, M. y Nax, H. H. 2016. A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games. Journal of Economic Theory, 162, 195-208. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.010

McCabe, K. A., Rigdon, M. L. y Smith, V. L. 2003. Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 52(2), 267-275. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(03)00003-9

McCubbins, M. D. y Turner, M. 2014. Are individuals fickle-minded? In Rethinking the individualism-holism debate (pp. 237-252). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05344-8_13

McFadden, D. 1976. Quantal choice analysis: a survey. Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, 5(4), 363-390. https://bit.ly/3Al0IQT

McKelvey, R. D. y Palfrey, T. R. 1995. Quantal response equilibria for normal form games. Games and Economic Behavior, 10(1), 6-38. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1023

Mejía, S. R., Pinos, L. G., Proaño, W. B. y Rojas, J. B. 2019. Expectativas empresariales y ciclo económico de la economía ecuatoriana. Podium, (36), 1-22. https://doi.org/10.31095/podium.201

Mohlin, E., Ostling, R. y Wang, J. T. 2020. Learning by similarity-weighted imitation in winner-takes-all games. Games and Economic Behavior, 120, 225-245. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.008

Moinas, S. y Pouget, S. 2013. The bubble game: an experimental study of speculation. Econometrica, 81(4), 1507-1539. https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9433

Morell, A. 2019. The short arm of guilt. An experiment on group identity and guilt aversion. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 166, 332-345. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.022

Nachbar, J. 2020. Learning in games. In Complex Social and Behavioral Systems (pp. 485-498). Springer US. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_307

Nagatsu, M. y Lisciandra, C. 2021. Why Is behavioral game theory a game for economists? The concept of beliefs in equilibrium. In A Genealogy of Self-Interest in Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9395-6_17

Napoli, A. y Fum, D. 2010. UC Merced Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society Title Mentalizing in games: A subtractive behavioral study of Prisoner’s Dilemma Mentalizing in games: A subtractive behavioral study of Prisoner’s Dilemma. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 32(32), 32.

Funes Neira, C. 2015. Bases de datos para la investigación en economía. Serie Bibliotecología y Gestión de Información., 94. https://bit.ly/3AqeQsg

Peeters, R. y Vorsatz, M. 2018. Simple guilt and cooperation. University of Otago Economics Discussion Papers. https://bit.ly/3JVN4Xr

Penczynski, S. P. 2016. Strategic thinking: The influence of the game. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 128, 72-84. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.05.006

Poundstone, W. 1992. Prisoner’s dilemma. Doubleday.

Póvoa, A. C. S., Pech, W. y Woiciekovski, E. 2020. Trust and social preferences: A cross-cultural experiment. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 86, 101526. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2020.101526

Proto, E., Rustichini, A. y Sofianos, A. 2019. Intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation in repeated interactions. Journal of Political Economy, 127(3), 1351-1390. https://doi.org/10.1086/701355

Radner, R. 1980. Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives. Journal of Economic Theory, 22(2), 136-154. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(80)90037-X

Rauhut, H. 2015. Stronger inspection incentives, less crime? Further experimental evidence on inspection games. Rationality and Society, 27(4), 414-454. https://doi.org/10.1177/1043463115576140

Regner, T. 2014. Social preferences? Google Answers! Games and Economic Behavior, 85, 188-209. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.01.013

Roberts, M. E. y Goldstone, R. L. 2011. Adaptive group coordination and role differentiation. PLoS ONE, 6(7), e22377. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0022377

Sacconi, L., Faillo, M. y Ottone, S. 2011. Contractarian compliance and the “sense of justice”: A behavioral conformity model and its experimental support. Analyse Und Kritik, 2011(1), 271-310. https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2011-0120

Sah, S. y Read, D. 2020. Mind the (Information) gap: Strategic nondisclosure by marketers and interventions to increase consumer deliberation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 26(3), 432-452. https://doi.org/10.1037/xap0000260

Scharlemann, J. P. W., Eckel, C. C., Kacelnik, A. y Wilson, R. K. 2001. The value of a smile: Game theory with a human face. Journal of Economic Psychology, 22(5), 617-640. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-4870(01)00059-9

Selten, R. 1978. The chain store paradox. Theory and Decision, 9(2), 127-159. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00131770

Simon, H. A. 1990. Bounded rationality. In Utility and Probability (pp. 15-18). Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20568-4_5

Song, F. 2008. Trust and reciprocity behavior and behavioral forecasts: Individuals versus group-representatives. Games and Economic Behavior, 62(2), 675-696. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.06.002

Song, F. 2009. Intergroup trust and reciprocity in strategic interactions: Effects of group decision-making mechanisms. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 108(1), 164-173. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2008.06.005

Srivastava, J., Chakravarti, D. y Rapoport, A. 2000. Price and margin negotiations in marketing channels: An experimental study of sequential bargaining under one-sided uncertainty and opportunity cost of delay. Marketing Science, 19(2), 163-184. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.19.2.163.11806

Sutter, M., Zoller, C. y Glätzle-Rützler, D. 2019. Economic behavior of children and adolescents. A first survey of experimental economics results. European Economic Review, 111, 98-121. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.09.004

Tarrant, C., Colman, A. M. y Stokes, T. 2008. Past experience, “shadow of the future”, and patient trust: A cross-sectional survey. British Journal of General Practice, 58(556), 780-783. https://doi.org/10.3399/bjgp08X342615

von Neumann, J. y Morgenstern, O. 1930. Theory of games and economic behavior. In Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. https://doi.org/10.1086/286866

Weizsacker, G. 2003. Ignoring the rationality of others: Evidence from experimental normal-form games. Games and Economic Behavior, 44(1), 145-171. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00017-4

Woon, J. 2018. Primaries and candidate polarization: behavioral theory and experimental evidence. American Political Science Review, 112(4), 826-843. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000515

Wu, J. 2018. Indirect higher order beliefs and cooperation. Experimental Economics, 21(4), 858-876. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-017-9555-y

Yang, Y. y Liu, L. 2019. Strategic uncertainty, coordination failure and emergence: A game theory study on agency-structure interactions. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 49(4), 402-420. https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12215

Zeitzoff, T. 2014. Anger, exposure to violence, and intragroup conflict: A “Lab in the Field” experiment in Southern Israel. Political Psychology, 35(3), 309-335. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12065